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Commentary
No. 297, Jan. 15, 2011
"Self-Determination
of Peoples? Which
Self?@
One of the guiding mantras of the twentieth
century was the self-determination of peoples, of nations. It was a piety to
which everyone assented in theory. But in practice, it was a very thorny, very
murky subject. The key difficulty is how to determine which
was the self, the people, the nation that would be entitled to determine its
own destiny,
There was never any accord on this subject.
In the case of colonies, it was a relatively simple question. But in the case
of a state already recognized as a sovereign state, opinion was very divided, usually violently divided. The issue is in the
headlines at the moment because of the referendum in southern Sudan where the
"people" are voting on whether they wish to remain part of the state
called Sudan or to constitute a new state separate from Sudan.
In every state, without exception, there are
people in state power who argue what we have come to call a
“Jacobin” position. They assert that all the citizens of that state
constitute a nation, one that has already determined its destiny. We talk of
nation-states as though the Jacobin principle were a reality rather than a
political aspiration. Jacobins say that the state should be reinforced and
strengthened by refusing to recognize the right, the legitimacy of any
so-called intermediate group to stand between the state and the citizens. All rights to the individual; no
rights to groups.
At the same time, in every state, again
without exception, there are others - often called "minorities" - who
contest this idea. They say that the Jacobin position hides the interest of
some "dominant" group which maintains its privileges at the expense
of all those who belong to groups other than the dominant group. The minorities
(who often, but not always, comprise in fact the numerical majority of the
population) argue that, unless the rights of groups are recognized, they are
denied equal participation in the state.
What "rights" do these minorities
feel are being denied to them? Sometimes it is linguistic rights, the right to
conduct legal, educational, and media business in a language other than the
"official" language. Sometimes, it is religious rights, the right to
practice openly a religion other than an officially recognized religion, and to
conduct their civil affairs under the religious laws that are part of their own
religion. Sometimes it is land rights, the rights of groups that hold land
under traditional rules that are different from the current rules enacted by
the state.
There are two strategies to secure the rights
of minority groups. One is to seek officially-recognized autonomy in various
spheres of social and legal life. The second, if the group occupies a
relatively compact geographical zone, is to seek secession, that is, to create
a new state. For many groups, these are alternatives between which they might
move. Having failed to achieve autonomy, they might seek secession. Or having
had their aspirations to secession defeated politically and/or militarily, they
might settle for autonomy.
The Kurds in Turkey as well as those in Iraq,
having sought secession, seem now ready to settle for autonomy. So, it seems,
will the francophones in Quebec. The people of the
southern Sudan have moved in the other direction, as did the Kosovars in Serbia.
The crucial point is that this is not, ever,
a question merely internal to a given state. To be a sovereign state, one must
be recognized by other sovereign states as a legitimate entity. Today, the
Turkish Republic of North Cyprus is recognized by only one other state. It
cannot therefore join international organizations, even if de facto it
continues to control its territory.
When Kosovo proclaimed its independence, it
was recognized only by less than half of the members of the United Nations. We
then have to ask why, and by which states? There were some states in Europe but
also elsewhere (notably China and Russia) who feared the precedent. They said
that, if the Kosovars could declare unilaterally
independence, similar groups in their countries might take this as a precedent.
The United States and certain states in western Europe
thought however that Kosovar independence from Serbia
served their geopolitical interest and encouraged the Kosovars
to proclaim their independence, which they immediately recognized, and to which
they give material and political assistance.
When Biafra sought to secede from Nigeria
several decades ago, almost all African states supported the efforts of the
Nigerian government to suppress the rebellion militarily. The main argument for
doing this is that secession of Biafra would set a terrible precedent in Africa
where almost all state boundaries were constituted arbitrarily by former
colonial powers and in fact traverse ethnic lines. The African states wanted to
preserve existing boundaries, however "artificial" they seemed, as
the only guarantee of collective order.
Now, it seems that the referendum in southern
Sudan will produce an overwhelming vote for secession. And the African states
that wouldn't recognize Biafra, plus China that won't recognize Kosovo, will
almost certainly recognize the new state that is now being created. Indeed,
even the state from which the secession is taking place seems to be ready to
recognize the new state.
Why? The answer is simple. There are
geopolitical reasons for doing this. China is interested in good future
relations with the new state, which will be a big oil exporter. Interest in
buying oil seems to be taking priority over worrying about a precedent for secessionist
groups in China. The Sudan seems ready to recognize the new state because the
United States has promised specific changes in its own policies vis-a-vis Sudan if they permit
the secession to proceed peacefully. The African states are overwhelmed by the
de facto accord between the two sides in this controversy. And in addition,
many of them sympathize with the groups in southern Sudan who are Nilotic peoples faced with a government dominated by Arab
peoples.
In the twenty-first century, the Jacobin option
is in retreat in most countries. The real question is autonomy versus secession
for the so-called minorities. Is one better than the other? There is no general
answer to that question. Each case is different in two ways. The actual
demography and history of each state is different and therefore what is
logically best and maximally just is different. In any case, any new state
resulting from secession will immediately discover "minorities"
within its boundaries. The debate never ends.
But there is a second consideration. Autonomy
versus secession has geopolitical consequences. And these are crucial in terms
of the ongoing struggles within the world-system as a whole. All parties
pursue, rather cynically, their self-interest as states. How they act can be
quite opposite from one situation to the other. This is because outside powers
are primarily concerned with the geopolitical impact of the decision. But it is
the role of these outside powers that is often decisive.
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence
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These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on
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headlines but of the long term.]
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